For the past twenty five years in Greece, welfare state reforms have been the result of the interplay between domestic politics and European influences. While pension reform has been aborted, some targeted and small-scale reforms have proven more successful. Wholesale changes of the welfare system have met with strong resistance by private interests and bureaucratic mechanisms. The EU's impact has mostly been felt in the policies of employment, vocational training, regional development and, less so, social assistance. Other welfare state reforms have remained mostly on paper. However, the Greek welfare regime is gradually undergoing a cognitive change, manifested in the diffuse of social rights, and has adopted EU-driven policy tools for consultation and decisionmaking. Throughout, path dependence has interacted with reform dynamics, flowing from the country's integration into the EU.
The little research that exists on the Europeanization of the Greek welfare state has claimed that the impact of the EU has been auxiliary but complex. There are two views on this. The first view states that 'EU-level coordination might have exerted some influence in the form of adding impetus to the Greek reform efforts… the Europeanization of Greek social policy has not led to welfare state retrenchment (Andreou and Koutsiaras 2002: 166-67 ).
The second view, which refers to Greece and Spain in comparative perspective, states that 'On the one hand, joining the EU has had the effect of fostering the expansion of social policies in order to close the existing gap with other European welfare states… On the other hand…the EMU has facilitated the use of blame-avoidance strategies acting as vincolo esterno' (Guillen and Matsaganis 2000: 140-41 ).
Both views correctly point out that, in contrast to other European cases, in Greece the decade of the 1990s was not associated with a retrenchment of the welfare state. In 1994-2003, under socialist party (PASOK) rule, social expenditure rose compared to the period of 1990-1993 when the conservative party (ND) was in power (data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Table 1 ). Moreover, the socialist government of C. Simitis (1996 Simitis ( -2004 has spent on social expenditure as much as the first socialist government of A. Papandreou (1981-89 ) and more than the latter's second government in [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . On the average, per year, social expenditure in 1996-2003 was 20.1 per cent of the GDP, whereas in 1981-89, 19.8 per cent.
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
Social expenditure today is above 22 per cent of the GDP (Table 1 ; 26 per cent compared to the EU average of 28 per cent, if we use ESSPROS data). By the beginning of this century, Greece has finally caught up with the West in terms of 'welfare effort'. This too is an aspect of Europeanization of the welfare state: social expenditure has risen to EU standards. However, in 2002, the annual per capita income of Greeks was 12.900 euros, in contrast to 23.000 euros, which was the EU average. Compared to other cases of EU member-states, the decline in poverty rate in Greece, after social transfers have been distributed, is small (Table 2 ). In the late 1990s, Greece deviated from the EU average in the following respects (Table 2) : a comparatively higher unemployment rate, particularly high youth unemployment rate; the ineffectiveness of social transfers in terms of fighting poverty; a more unequal income distribution; and a comparatively lower female participation in the labour force.
[ TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ]
Such differences between Greece and other EU member-states may be understood in the context of specific domestic political and administrative factors and concrete social class interests. Relevant political factors are the persistence of a very conflictual political culture, the intense bipolar character of the Greek party system and the organizational deficiencies of the Greek welfare administration. Concrete social class interests, on the other hand, include public sector employees and liberal professionals. For different reasons, such employees and professionals have defended a very unequal system of social protection demarcating 'insiders', who are beneficiaries of 'noble' social security funds, and 'outsiders' of the system, who participate in much less well-endowed funds. The situation is similar with medical school professors, unions of public hospital employees and investors in private health care who, again for different reasons, have resisted any substantive change in health care provision since 1983, when the Greek National Health Service (ESY) was founded.
Our argument is that, as a result of the above factors, more continuity rather than change characterizes the way the Greek welfare system is financed and the way it dispenses social transfers, which have not changed since at least 1982 (Table 3) . Reforms related to these aspects have remained on paper. Using the concepts of Pierson (1994) , we may say that the fundamental structure of the Greek welfare regime has remained comparably stable and that existing commitments have locked in policy makers. However, there is more change in the policy tools used and in the content of policies related to labour markets, employment, vocational training, regional development and, less so, social assistance. In these policy domains, changes have not remained on paper. Owing to the growing integration of Greece into the EU, reform has prevailed over institutional legacies in the way social policy is formulated and in the subject matter of some, but not all, policy areas.
In this paper we will not discuss all aspects of Europeanization which, according to the relevant literature, involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003) . We will make a distinction between the Europeanization of policy-making (including the corresponding EU's impact on discourse, i.e. the cognitive level of Europeanization), on the one hand, and the Europeanization of the substance of policies, on the other.
In the following section of this article, we are going to briefly sketch some components of an emerging model of welfare in the EU and the components of the Greek welfare state. Next, we will contrast domestic and EU influences on Greek social policies between 1981 and today. In the main body of the paper, we will briefly discuss EU's impact on policy tools and the content of six policy areas. In the last section, we will trace the causes of relative resilience of the traditional Greek welfare regime.
An emerging 'European social model' and the Greek welfare state
There seems to be an emerging European social model. A recent version of the model includes six 'policy headlines' (Commission of the EC 2003: 12-22):
• The creation of more and better jobs • A new balance between individual security and flexibility • The fight against poverty and social exclusion • The linking of economic performance with solidarity • The promotion of gender equality and • The strengthening of social policy aspects of East European enlargement
The above headlines are a set of norms, reflecting the Lisbon strategy, set out in 2000, to create out of current EU a competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy. The norms are diffused not so much through rigid regulation, but through softer channels, such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). We may say that the Greek welfare state stands at the crossroads between the traditional South European welfare model (Ferrera 1996) and the gradually emerging European social model.
Of course, Greek political elites and the society interpret the model variably, as other national elites and societies do. For instance, since the late 1940s elites have followed a developmentalist ideology, so that Greece would "catch up" with the West (Mouzelis 1978, Guillen, this issue) . In the 1970s and the 1980s, even before there was talk of a European social model, for some Greeks the concept of Europeanization of welfare meant a growth of social expenditure with the aim of achieving West European living standards. In the late 1990s, more in line with the rest of the EU, for some people this concept meant a more effective social protection against unemployment and the risks of old age.
Shifts in perceptions have not been accompanied by structural shifts away from the traditional characteristics of the Greek welfare system. These are fragmentation and clientelism in the funding and delivery of social protection, leading to large-scale inequities; predominance of cash benefits over other kinds of transfers or services; and preponderance of pensions among all cash benefits (Table 2 and Petmesidou 1996 , Symeonidou 1996 , Ifandopoulos 2002 . The Greek National Health System (ESY) is based on general taxation, while social security is organized along occupational lines and funded by contributions. Acting as a collective patron in the area of social policy, the Greek state has selectively benefited the insurance funds of specific occupational groups (the so-called 'noble' funds). Beneficiaries, who are 'insiders' of the social security system, include certain liberal professions and high-status occupations (engineers, lawyers, doctors, journalists) and the employees of corporations of the wider public sector. Throughout the post-war period, the Greek state has put employees of the private sector, own-account workers, and women in general in a disadvantaged position (Sotiropoulos 2003) . These are the 'outsiders' who have not benefited from the clientelist distribution of welfare privileges. This clientelist legacy has not changed dramatically since Greece's accession to the EEC in 1981.
a) The pre-accession and immediate post-accession phase The transition from the colonels' regime in 1974, fueled demands not only for political democracy, but also for higher living standards. Pressures from below, i.e., from workers, farmers and employees of the public sector, mounted. Political rights, re-established after the interlude of the military junta , were now accompanied by social rights, recognized in the constitution of 1975. Accession to the EEC was fiercely debated, and the Greek state and economy were not particularly prepared to enter the EEC. Pre-accession social policies were not linked to such a prospect.
In October 1981, a major government turnover took place, as the socialist party (PASOK) came to power. The Greek political system shifted to the left, after the seven year -long military dictatorship and a seven year -long rule of the conservative party (ND, in 1974-81) . PASOK stayed in power until 1989, and the largest part of the 1980s was characterized by welfare expansion. The impact of the 1981 accession on the Greek welfare state was minimal. Although some regulations, such as Regulation 1612/1968 (concerning equality of pay, unionization rights, etc.), were to become immediately effective, in practice Greece was granted a long period of adaptation to the EEC. For instance, for Greeks seeking work in EEC countries, labour mobility would not become effective until 1988 (Provopoulos 1987: 45) .
PASOK's rise to power marked a quantitative shift in social policy. On the average, annual social expenditure as share of the GDP rose from around 14 per cent on the average under ND, in 1975 -81, to 20 percent under PASOK, in 1982 (Table 1 ). In the 1980s, the socialist government practiced redistribution: it ignored fiscal constraints and satisfied popular demands in a cumulative manner, which could not be sustained in the long-run (Kazakos 1998: 158) . Increases in social spending reflected the composition of PASOK's electoral base. PASOK rose to power on the shoulders of a large social class coalition, which included the petite bourgeoisie (artisans, craftsmen, farmers, shopkeepers), the new middle class (public sector employees, liberal professionals) and the working class. One of the first measures of the socialist/populist government was to increase the very low agricultural pension by 100 per cent and the minimum wage and minimum pension in the private sector by 40 per cent (Guillen and Matsaganis 2000: 135) . In other words, in Greece the expansion of the welfare state was not linked so much to the country's integration into the EEC, as to a drive to catch up with the West. The drive included a long period of economic adaptation during which Greece became a service-oriented economy, witnessed Greek migrants return from Western Europe, and after 1989 experienced a large inflow of migrants from Southeastern Europe.
In the 1980s, the rise in social expenditure was not accompanied by structural changes in the social security system. By contrast, major changes took place in family policy and in the public health system. In 1982, PASOK changed the family law, by amending the relevant section of the Greek Civil Code, in order to promote gender equality. In 1983, the socialist government founded the Greek National Health System. Although the establishment of a nationwide public health system, including a network of local health centres ('Kentra Hygheias'), was a major achievement of PASOK, the emergence of ESY did not lead to the eclipse of occupational health schemes. Meanwhile, doctors joined the public health sector and also continued their private practices. In health care, there was a collusion of public and private interests which fostered extensive corruption (Petmesidou 2000: 303 and 310, Carpenter 2003, Mossialos and Davaki forthcoming) .
b) The 1990s
Increased social spending, along with high defense spending (owed to persisting tensions with Turkey), strained public finances. Greece's public debt had already started increasing in the 1970s, under ND rule. It soared in the 1980s, under PASOK rule. Since then, Greek public finances have never really recovered. The debt was around 125 per cent of the GDP in the mid-1990s and still hovered around 100 per cent in 2001 (Petmesidou 2000 : 306, Tinios 2003 . During the short-term rule of ND (1990-93) , the EEC warned against the continuation of the economic policies of the 1980s. In 1990-93, social expenditure fell by one percentage point in comparison with the 1981-89 period (Table 1) . A measure of the conservative government was to streamline the pension system: it passed two laws on the pension system (in 1990 and in 1992) , bringing about parametric rather than structural changes to the system. The original drafts of laws were modified after strong opposition by the trade unions, the leadership of which represented the interests of the 'insiders' of the system. Pension reform under ND was not so much the outcome of the country's integration to the EEC as the result of fiscal constraints. These were owed to the country's huge public debt. The results of the 1990-92 reform were mixed. Finances improved, but the basic structure of social protection was left untouched. Low-income pensioners suffered losses. The so-called 'noble' occupational funds did not suffer as much. The new laws passed by ND, required higher contributions from those who entered the labour market after 1993. Consequently, the financial burden of offering social protection to older generations of insured people was passed on to younger and also to future generations of employees.
Since PASOK's comeback to power in 1993, a shift towards more strict macroeconomic policies became apparent. The shift has become more clear since 1996, when Simitis succeeded Papandreou as Prime Minister of the socialist government. Simitis has been keen not only on conforming, but also on contributing to the shaping of EU strategies and policies. Change has been reflected more in the tools than in the substance of policy making of the Greek government. We will first summarize the former and then move to the latter. 6 
The Europeanization of social policy tools
The rise of Simitis (a modernizing social democrat) to power, combined with the impact of the EU, brought about changes in the way social policy is formulated and monitored in Greece. Europeanization can be traced in the emergence of four policy tools. a) Neo-corporatist structures of consultation among social partners
In the second half of the 1990s, systematic rounds of consultation took place among the government and nationwide representatives of employers and employees. Relevant 'committees of social dialogue' on employment and pensions were formed in 1997. The results of 'social dialogue' were not impressive, as participants eventually kept to their original positions, while the products of the dialogue were a set of non-binding statements. The intermediation between the government, which envisaged major reforms in the welfare state, and labour representatives was not a cosmetic exercise, but did not bear any fruits either. Reform through consensus-building was an attempted strategy which remained on paper.
However, two cognitive changes are worth mentioning. First, the discourse of labour representatives was remarkably different from the past (Kioukias 2003: 28) . In the 1970s and the 1980s, labour leaders used to argue on ideological terms. By contrast, in the late 1990s they were ready to furnish evidence and use the language of expertise, for instance drawing on empirical research conducted by the Labour Institute (INE) associated with the peak labour association (GSEE-General Confederation of Workers of Greece). Second, for the Greek system of industrial relations, which used to be an idiosyncratic case of state corporatism functioning within a democratic political regime, the aforementioned tripartite consultation was a step in the long process of transition to neo-corporatism.
The above changes have not altered the traditional neglect shown by the Greek state towards the funds of the less 'noble' occupational categories, such as own-account workers, employees and manual workers of the private sector. The latter two categories are less well represented in the higher organs of peak confederations of labour. The occupational origins of labour representatives (who are mostly public sector employees and belong to the 'noble' funds) explains -to an extentthe inability of the new structure of interest intermediation to cover the distance between the government's plans and the social partners' interests. The same fact explains the fierce resistance put by peak confederations of labour to PASOK's aborted pension reforms of 1998 and 2001.
b) Expert committees
In Greece there is a tradition of constituting ad hoc committees, the product of which ends up in a remote file cabinet and remains unused. Typical examples were a short-lived committee on social security reform, formed by Minister G. Gennimatas in the mid-1980s, and the Experts' Committee on public health reform in the early 1990s.
The difference with the committees constituted under Simitis in 1997-2000 was that the latter reflected a comprehensive concept of reform, envisaged to simultaneously cover labour markets, industrial relations and the social security system. The committees were formed under initiatives taken by the Prime Minister himself, rather than individual ministers, and were coordinated by the same person (Professor John Spraos, whose name the committees bore). In contrast to the past, main recommendations of these committees were submitted to public debate. The scope and systematic character of such committees is another instance of Europeanization. The committees reflected the influence of the EC's White Paper of 1993 and the Luxembourg process, which emphasized the coordination of economic and social policies.
c) New institutions
The foundation of new institutions may be seen in the same context. Drawing on EU funds, the government has created new staff and line administrative hierarchies which would be more flexible than the sprawling central services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Examples included the Organization of Education and Vocational Training (OEEK, founded in 1992), the Economic and Social Committee (OKE, founded in 1994) , and the National Organization of Social Care (EOKF, founded in 1998).
New policy tools at the regional level included Regional Operational Programmes, Local Employment Action Plans, Integrated Local Interventions and Developmental Pacts (in the context of the EU initiative EQUAL). The government has reformed the Greek Employment Agency (OAED) and has founded local centres for the promotion of employment (in 2002 there were 60 such centres). The motive behind these new institutions was not only the size of unemployment (11.1 per cent in 2000 and 10.2 in 2001), but also the fact that Greece has one of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the EU: in 2001, overall employment was 55.4 per cent as contrasted to the EU average of 64.9 per cent (Council of the European Union 2003: 124). The evolution of new institutions was variable. For instance, the regional decentralization of the Economic and Social Committee (OKE), albeit provided by law, has never been really materialized. Regional branches (NOKE) of the Committee were to be created at the level of prefectures ('nomarchies'), but no funds or personnel were allocated to this task (Kioukias 2003: 129) . This decentralization was effected only on paper.
The National Organization of Social Care (EOKF) was under-staffed in the first four years of its existence. Three old social care organizations which, according to the founding law of EOKF (passed in 1998), should have merged into EOKF, managed to survive as independent units. In early 2003, under a new law, social care competencies were transferred to regional authorities. EOKF was transformed into a 'National Council for Social Care' (ESYKF), i.e., into a wider framework structure.
The importance of the aforementioned new institutions has been more evident at the cognitive level than that of social policy formulation or implementation. The institutions have contributed to the socialization of welfare administrators and social partners into the logic of EUdriven social policies (see Guillen and also Lendvai, this issue, for similar conclusions about Spain and Eastern Europe). The socialization involved the diffusion of extended social rights, including gender equality and rights related to the hygiene and safety of working conditions, as well as the rationalization of social policies. After decades of haphazard decision-making in social affairs, in Greece -thanks to the requirements of European integration -stress was now put on setting measurable targets; absorbing earmarked funds within reasonable time limits; following up the implementation of legislated policies; and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of attempted measures.
Cognitive change did not happen overnight, just because of Greece's integration into the EU. The functions of the aforementioned new institutions were not shaped at the time point of their creation. They were constantly re-defined, depending on the flow of funds, on the wavering political support the institutions enjoyed by cabinet ministers, and on the 'fit' between the new institutions and the rest of old public organizations and central services of ministries. For instance, two practically antagonistic institutions, the National Observatory of Employment (EPA) and the National Foundation of Employment (EIE), which in the 1990s simultaneously monitored labour market developments, were merged into one institution in 2001.
d) National Action Plans
After the adoption of the European Employment Strategy, each member-state devised a 'National Action Plan' for employment. The Greek government produced four National Action Plans for employment in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 . It also devised two National Action Plans on social inclusion in 2001 and 2003 and a national strategy for the reform of the pension system. However, only a systematic and comparative evaluation of past plans, which is beyond the scope of this article, would allow us to grasp setbacks encountered in their implementation. For instance, it is telling that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which is in charge of the Plans, has encountered difficulties in mobilizing the rest of the state apparatus for the implementation of plans. Nevertheless, importing the logic of coordinated planning from the EU has marked a significant shift the programming and monitoring of Greek social policy.
The Europeanization of social policy areas
Successive Greek governments have followed a course of action in various social policy areas, which looked like a meander. Formal collective agents, such as the central bank of Greece, involved ministries and public bodies, and the courts, pushed policy shifts to directions other than those originally intended by the government. In this section, the interplay of domestic interests and EU pressures may be shown through examples from six different policy areas. In order to follow EU guidelines on labour market reform, the Greek government has introduced new legislation and has also determined certain policy tools (Lyberaki and Tinios 2003: 229-232 and 239-241) . Measures included incentives to employers to decrease over-time work, by increasing over-time pay; and to hire new personnel by decreasing social security contributions in the case of lowly-paid workers and by decreasing the taxation rate on corporate profits (from 40 to 35 per cent); as well as incentives to those seeking part-time employment, by increasing compensation for part-time jobs. The 2003 National Action Plan for Employment aims at encouraging and spreading part-time work, expanding child-support infrastructure and decreasing gender inequalities.
Since the late 1990s, labour market and employment policies in Greece have clearly borne the impact of EU. Their has been a vast mobilization of personnel, funds and other resources to meet EU requirements. Owing to pressures from the EU, the new policies have opened up opportunities for Greek women, the young and the unemployed. Overall, institutional legacies have given ground to new dynamics emanating from EU's concern with employment promotion.
B) The Pension System
The impact of EU is not as visible in pension policy, an area in which, until recently, institutional legacies continued to play a major role. In the post-war period, the state used to closely monitor the financial management of the pension funds to the point of obliging the funds to deposit their reserves in the central bank (Bank of Greece) at low interest rates. When in deficit, funds were obliged to borrow from state-run banks on unfavorable terms (Vourloumis 2002: 89, Petmesidou 2000: 320 and 327) . This practice was partially changed in 1994, when a new law was passed allowing the funds greater discretion in the use of their financial resources. However, four years later, a special board was established by the Bank of Greece to supervise investments by the pension funds. The shift towards more autonomy of fund management did not remain on paper, but was partially reversed.
The government of Simitis introduced a pension supplement (EKAS) in 1996, in order to support low-income pensioners. This was a targeted, means-tested social assistance measure. In the same vein, another means-tested benefit was targeted to families with many children earning below a certain level of annual income. However, the highest administrative court has struck down this measure. As a consequence, even well-to-do families were entitled to the benefit. The Simitis government also proceeded with the transformation of the farmers' pension fund (OGA) from a general taxation-based fund to a contributions-based fund (Petmesidou 2000: 320) . In December 1998, the government also attempted the so-called 'mini-reform' of pensions. The thrust of this reform was twofold: first, the unification of pension funds and, second, the imposition of stricter rules for awarding benefits to pensioners and their survivors. Only some debt-ridden supplementary funds were merged into IKA (Social Security Foundation -the largest fund covering the private sector), and a new unified supplementary fund for public employees was founded (Petmesidou 2000: 319-20) . The unification of three funds of self-employed workers (TEVE of artisans and small shop keepers, TAE of merchants and TSA of owners of transport vehicles and taxi drivers) was officially provided by the reform. This would have been a major change for the total of 800,000 persons insured in the three funds. A new fund was founded in order to absorb these funds. However, in early 2003, four years into the 'mini-reform, each fund still preserved its administrative and financial autonomy from the new larger fund (Tinios 2003: 33) . In this respect, the projected reform has remained on paper.
After winning general elections once more in 2000, Simitis set out to reform the pension system (Featherstone, Kazamias and Papadimitriou 2001 , Matsaganis 2002a , Venieris 2003 , Triantafillou 2003 . Based on a report on the Greek system, drafted by experts of British Government Actuaries Department, the government announced a wholesale reform in the spring of 2001 (the Giannitsis reform, thus called after the name of the competent minister). The reform imposed lower replacement rates along with higher age thresholds for retirement; provided for the merger of many funds to several new, socio-professional schemes; and distributed the financial costs of the system among all categories of insured persons, including the relatively well-protected employees of public corporations. However, upon the announcement of the reform, a sort of social revolt erupted. All confederations of workers and employees and the mass media challenged the reform as a neo-liberal attack on pension rights, leading to retrenchment of the welfare state. Massive demonstrations shook Athens. The government was obliged to take the reform back.
A second attempt at a watered-down reform was made in 2002 (the Reppas reform). This reform had to do only with the pensions of employees of the private sector; it did not deal with the rest of insured people. The thrust of the reform was, first, the voluntary merger of all main and supplementary funds into a single one and, second, the creation of occupational funds based on capitalization. Except for those structural changes, the reform included parametric changes. For example, after 2007, there will be a unified replacement rate -at 70 per cent -for all employees who have entered the labour market after 1993. For persons insured in IKA (Social Security Foundation), the reference years for calculating the pension will be the best five out the last ten years of one's employment career (Triantafillou 2003 : Table 9, Venieris 2003 . The new law on the whole modified the egalitarian tone of the aborted Giannitsis reform (Matsaganis 2002a: 117) .
Nevertheless, owing to the introduction of funded schemes, the Reppas law can be considered a first hesitant step towards a multi-pillar pension system of the kind adopted in other EU member-states. While wholesale reform is still pending, specific sectors of the pension system are changing, in accordance to wider trends in the EU. For instance, the IKA fund has introduced a management information system which facilitates contacts with its clients and reduces red tape. In sum, institutional legacies are still very strong, but there is a dynamic of change, influenced by EU developments. Pension reform may proceed in a fragmentary fashion, but, given the segmented nature of the Greek pension system, such a development may be unavoidable.
C) Public Health Care
Between the foundation of the National Health System (1983) and the late 1990s there were hardly any structural changes in health care. In 1997 a law changing managerial aspects of the public health care system was passed. The financial management of hospitals was streamlined and the managers of hospitals were to be selected on the basis of expertise rather than their political credentials. Out-patient departments of hospitals and health centres were to cooperate in order to improve first-tier health care. However, these provisions of the law were not implemented (Petmesidou 2000: 321) . First-tier public health care was not ameliorated. In the cities, the coordination of first-tier health services did not take place, as envisaged by the law (Mossialos and Davaki forthcoming). In the rural areas, many of the 170 health centres malfunction. In other words, a part of the projected reform has remained on paper.
After the re-election of Simitis in 2000, the new Minister of Health passed a law which created the Regional Health System (the Papadopoulos reform). The country was divided in seventeen regions, each of which was endowed with its own regional health authority (PESY). There would be seventeen regional PESYs. Managers of these authorities were given large powers to oversee the provision of health care in their district. The same law obliged medical school professors to choose whether they would practice in private clinics (in which case they were required to resign from the university) or in (public) university hospital (Mossialos and Davaki forthcoming). Professors, most of whom used to practice in both, in addition to running their own private practices, staged an almost year-long strike and won the battle.
As a result of the entrenched interests of doctors, public hospital personnel, and private businessmen, the delivery of public health care shows mixed results. Since the end of the 1990s, new hospital buildings have been built in many regions of Greece and new managers have been appointed. However, there is also a continuation of old trends. These include a lack of competent medical personnel; misuse of funds; and degradation of facilities. In the meantime, patients who could afford to pay, have turned to private health care; private diagnostic centres have mushroomed; and in some sub-systems, such as maternity care, private oligopolies have arisen. Overall, the impact of the EU on health care was not strong, and institutional legacies have prevailed over attempts at reform.
D) Social Assistance
There is a long-term interest on the part of the EU on poverty issues (e.g., the "Poverty" programmes of the early 1990s, the recent NAP/incl). It comes then as no surprise that, compared to health policy, EU's impact has become more visible in social assistance. The last Simitis government (2000-04) presented National Action Plans, which included specific measures to fight poverty and social exclusion (Andreou and Koutsiaras 2002: 166) . The plans entailed noncontributory transfers and services to citizens in need.
However, in 2001, non-contributory benefits constituted only 16.3 per cent of total spending in social security. Income-tested benefits constituted only 4.7 per cent of all benefits (Matsaganis, Ferrera, Capucha and Moreno 2003: 644) . At the same time, the take up of two new social assistance benefits has remained low. The first was the social security rebate promised by Simitis just before the elections of 2000: minimum wage earners would take back from the state the share of their gross minimum wage which they paid to social insurance funds. The second measure was unemployment assistance directed to long term unemployed persons who were low-income and middle-aged. Both measures were much less effective than envisaged because of very low take-up (Idem). To sum up, on paper, other important measures on social assistance were taken in the 1990s (Guillen and Matsaganis 2000: 125-26, Tsakloglou 2000: 339) . However, the application of such measures has remained variable and unpredictable.
E) Family and Child Care
The family in Southern Europe functions as a cushion to unemployment, providing unemployed family members with shelter, food and often work in the informal economy (Bermeo 1999: 273-75) . Greece is no exception to this pattern. For instance, officially unemployed family members work as un-registered workers in businesses of their families. Because of lack of adequate public nurseries, the family also provides child care. The family provides care for the elderly too: old age pensioners in Greece are among the groups primarily hit by poverty. They cannot count on the under-funded social care system. In the Greek family, all the above social care functions are performed by women (in the capacity of wives, daughters or grand mothers). Greek society in the beginning of the twenty first century is still traditional in terms of gender roles. At the same time, new forms of family such as single-parent families and co-habitating couples have timidly appeared in large urban centres.
Some signs of change in family policy had appeared with the first post-authoritarian constitution of 1975, in which gender equality was proclaimed. In the post-authoritarian period, mothers who had four or more children were awarded a pension for life. The next policy steps were taken in the 1990s. These were the result of the demographic decline of the Greek population (Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti 2002: 154) , rather than the result of any EU influence. Allowances were awarded to mothers out-of -the wedlock, while leaves of absence were instituted in order to facilitate motherhood (Matsaganis 2002b: 164-165 and 184, Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti 2002: 152) .
However, today, leaves of absence are comparatively short for Greek mothers (Flaquer 2002: 54) , except for those who work in the public sector (Matsaganis 2002b) . In comparative terms, allowances for the first or the second child in Greece are among the lowest in the EU. Allowances for the third child are handed out for a brief period (until the child becomes six years old). It is only in the case of families with four or more children that the Greek policy becomes generous (Matsaganis 2002b: 175-176) .
In general, Greek family policy reflects some traditional fixed ideas. The policy is biased towards the social protection of families with four or more children; it offers slim and short-term social protection to the rest of the families; it reproduces divisions between the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders' of the system because most allowances are linked to occupational status; and it is characterized by a problematic infrastructure for child care (e.g., few and under-funded public nurseries).
Such long-term characteristics of the Greek family policy, go against the proclaimed intention of the EU and the Greek government to increase the labour force participation of women and to make career and family obligations compatible for women. Indeed the Greek National Action Plans for Employment and Social Inclusion stress such policy preferences (Lyberaki and Tinios 2002, Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2002) . In sum, it seems that, owing to traditional gender relations and fixed ideas of domestic policy-makers, EU' s impact on Greek family policy is more strong in setting policy targets than in fulfilling them. In other words, institutional legacies and domestic concerns weigh over EU-driven modernization.
F) Structural and Cohesion Funds
Greece has been one of the main beneficiaries of transfers flowing from EU's structural and cohesion funds (Tsoukalis 1998 : 300-302, Ioakimidis 1998 . In 1986, the country was divided into thirteen regions in order to absorb the funds of Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. The programmes offered a first economic boost to some regions of Greece. After the reform of the structural funds in 1988, the country as a whole was classified in the group of "Objective 1" (the less developed areas of the EEC).
The flow of structural funds in 1989-1993, during the first CFS (Community Support Framework), accelerated the growth in the Greek economy in the early 1990s by 1 per cent per year (Tsoukalis 1998: 303) . In the first CSF, approximately 40 per cent of the funds which were transferred to Greece, were spent on infrastructure, 21 per cent on human resources, 19 per cent on agriculture and 8 per cent on industry. In the second CSF (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , funds poured into Greece accelerated the country' annual economic growth by 1.1 per cent per year (Kazakos 2001: 489) . Around 50 per cent of all CSF funds went to infrastructure, 22 per cent to human resources, 15 per cent to agriculture and 8 per cent to industry.
Notably only 1.3 per cent of the funds from the first CSF allocated to Greece and 4.4 per cent of the corresponding funds of the second CSF were channeled to public health and social care (Ioakeimidis 1998: 99, Table 6 ). In other words, Greece spent most of the funds on infrastructure (transport and communications), a fact which reflected the country's relatively low economic and administrative development at the time (Tsoukalis 1998: 302) . The CSFs and Community Initiatives contributed to job creation. New units of the public administration, regional authorities, private consulting companies, training centres, municipal enterprises and local cooperatives were founded in order to absorb transfers from EU's structural and cohesion funds.
EU's structural and cohesion policies have also produced reform of vocational training. Until the appearance of this EU's concerted effort, manifested in the two CSFs, the European Commission's White Book of 1993, and Community Initiatives, such as 'Leonardo da Vinci', vocational training in Greece was under-funded (Ioakimidis 1998: 102-04) . Finally, the redistributive impact of EU's structural and cohesion funds was evident among the regions of Greece. The country's undeveloped regions witnessed a large flow of funds: in the first CSF, the EU channeled approximately 1.5 billion ECUs to Greece's thirteen regions; in the second CSF, the corresponding sum went up to 4.5 billion ECUs ( Ioakimidis 1998: 195, Table 10) .
Despite the Europeanization of labour, vocational training, regional and, to an extent, social assistance policies, in pensions, health and family policies institutional legacies have countered pressures to reform. Some targeted and small-scale reforms have proven more successful than wholesale changes of the welfare system, which have met with increased resistance by vested interests and bureaucratic mechanisms. As a consequence, the basic structure of the Greek welfare regime today is not so different from what it used to be thirty years ago. How could we explain this resilience?
The causes of the relative Greek resilience
There are at least three answers to the above question. First, it has been argued that the problem lies in the lack of suitable advocacy coalitions which would have promoted reform (Matsaganis 2002a : 119, Triantafyllou 2003 , Vourloumis 2002 . The resilience of traditional policies is owed to the fierce resistance of another advocacy coalition, composed of the 'insiders', i.e., interest groups benefiting the most from the prolongation of the inequities of the social security system. For instance, public sector trade unions have high organizational density, can obstruct reforms and are able to influence public opinion.
A second view, complementary to the first, blames weak state institutions for the perpetuation of reform failure (Petmesidou 2000: 303 and 324) . Weakness refers to state incapacity to implement policies. For instance, in regard to the implementation of European Social Fund (ESF) programmes in the 1990s, the performance of the Greek system suffered from the lack of adequate funding and infrastructure, the unpredictability of hiring and transfering of personnel, and the unsuitability of mechanisms of planning, monitoring and evaluation (Kontiadis 1997: 141, 147-48) . The implementation of the First Community Support Framework (CSF) in Greece in regard to vocational training is another case in point. There was large-scale corruption and inefficiency (Petmesidou 2000 : 317, Kontiadis 1997 . The Second CSF witnessed very slow absorption rates. For a time, EU-funded vocational training programmes in Greece came to a complete halt, imposed by the EU, until new, more strict rules were imposed by the end of 1998. There were frequent changes in the Ministry of Labour's organizational chart. Finally, the Ministry has created a manageable administrative structure (a General Secretariat), able to monitor the implementation of EU programmes. Contributions-based insurance funds, on the other hand, have long suffered from the lack of personnel, computers and effective procedures of day-today management. The problems were related to extensive contribution evasion (Tatsos 2001: 173) .
A third view stresses the negative role played by predominant public attitudes which inhibit reform. On the basis of survey data collected in 1999, it seems that respondents were optimistic about their individual prospects as pensioners in the future. For those who belonged to the most well-endowed occupational funds, optimism may be explained by the advantages they enjoyed; for the rest, optimism may be explained by ignorance of what is at stake in pension reform (O' Donnel and Tinios 2003: 262 and 276-78, Tinios 2003: 146-47 and 207) . The majority of wage-earners belong to the poorest funds, but identify with the current system, fearing that even their low benefits could be threatened by any change of the system.
In our view the three approaches noted above are complementary to each other, but do not link the problem of inertia with the political system nor do they emphasize the inhibiting role of private interests. On the one hand, for three decades now , the priorities of successive Greek governments lied in defense and in macroeconomic stabilization. Even when it seemed that the priorities were shifted to the curbing of social inequalities, as during PASOK's first term in power and again after 1996, defense spending remained high. Part of the explanation for this lies in the Greek-Turkish relations, which have remained tense for most of the aforementioned period.
On the other hand, even though neither ND nor PASOK espouses welfare retrenchment, consensus over specific social policy reforms is not forthcoming. The rhetoric of both parties over social policy has been inflammatory. Political polarization is not conducive to welfare reform. In Greece, a political culture of uncompromising views combines with a rigid bi-polar party system. No wonder why consensual choices about specific policy reforms are hard to obtain.
The last, but not least, cause of resilience lies in the collusion between private and public interests and particularly in the reluctance of different social classes to share the cost of welfare state reform. Contribution evasion on the part of employees of the private sector and, primarily, on the part of private businessmen is rampant. The latter have evaded paying contributions the total of which surpasses tax evasion by employees (Tatsos 2001: 179 , comparative data on tax evasion for 1997). It is not uncommon for private employers to have deducted social insurance contributions from the wages of their employees without passing the deducted sums to the insurance funds.
To an extent, this behavior might be explained by the comparatively high rate of contributions required of Greek employees and employers: in 1997, as far as contributions to IKA were concerned, employees contributed 15.9 per cent of their gross wage and employers, on their part, another 28.2 per cent (adding up to a total of 44.1 per cent of gross wage; Spraos 1997: 34-35, Table 3 .4). It has been estimated that in 1997 contribution evasion in all insurance funds amounted to 650 billion Greek drachmas (around 1.9 billion Euros). In several insurance funds, contribution evasion was equal to around 30-35 per cent of their total revenue from contributions (Tatsos 2001: 173-74) . Some of the public corporations, whose personnel is insured in IKA, have also largely delayed payments to this fund. Private businessmen who employ illegal immigrants avoid paying social insurance contributions for them. Many immigrants also avoid doing this for themselves.
In public health care, doctors, many of whom practice in private surgeries while also keeping their jobs in public hospitals, have no interest in substantive reform (Guillen 2002: 57) . Logically we would expect that businessmen who have invested in pharmaceutical industries, in the construction of private clinics, and in importing medical technology, share this indifference. The 'kickbacks', which businessmen allegedly distribute to involved parties in the public health system, must be a small cost for the size of business revenue.
The reluctance of employers to carry their share of the burden of welfare reform, by paying their dues, is combined with a lack of will of successive Greek governments to exert any pressure on employers. This, class-biased political choice has turned welfare state reform into a tug-of-war between a state facing a recurrent fiscal crisis and various strata of employees facing the possibility of a reduced pension.
Conclusions
In this article we have argued that after Greece joined the EEC, welfare reforms were mostly the result of domestic politics than of European influence. The expansionist social policies of the 1980s were owed to the eight-year long rule of the socialist party . In the 1990s, Greece managed to meet the Maastricht criteria without financially consolidating its pension system (Matsaganis 2002a: 115, Featherstone, Kazamias and Papadimitriou 2001) . Today Greece lags behind other EU member-states in transforming its pension system towards a multi-pillar model (Tinios 2003: 18) .
Greece is the only country in the EU without a minimum income guarantee (Matsaganis, Ferrera, Capucha and Moreno 2003: 644) . It is a country with soaring private consumption on health: private health spending is equal to 40 per cent of total health expenditure ( Petmesidou 2000: 322) . At the same time its National Health System is ailing. The links between the public health system and the informal economy are extensive. Rampant corruption and mismanagement (e.g., in the procurement of infrastructure for hospitals) have continued unabated. In these respects, the evolution of the Greek welfare regime looks path dependent: pressures to change, stemming from the EU, have not overcome institutional legacies in regard to pensions, health care and family policies. However, as we noted several times in this article, in other respects Greece is not the usual exception to the European rule anymore. At the cognitive level, there has been a major change: Greek authorities and social partners have been socialized to work in a context of programming, coordination and rationalization of social policies, the standards for which have been set in the EU and diffused in the country.
Beyond the cognitive level, the impact of the EU has been visible in Greece in selected social policy areas. These include labour markets, regional development, vocational training and, less so, social asisstance. In these policy areas there has been a goodness of fit between domestic initiatives and EU-policies. Also Greece has adopted an array of EU-driven policy tools and institutions of monitoring and decision-making in social policy. The new mode of policy-making includes, on the one hand, consultation among political authorities, representatives of interest groups, technocrats and the staff of new institutions; and, on the other hand, drafting and dissemination of opinion papers and plans for action, in which many social partners and agencies, other than the central services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, are involved. In a unitary and very little decentralized administrative system, and in a political system traditionally characterized by political polarization, such the current Greek one, all this is no small accomplishment.
